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In George Ruggle's well-known comedy Ignoramus from 1615, a college 
recorder and common lawyer named Ambidexter Ignoramus is set against 
the humanistic ideals of the university environment in which the play was 
written and performed as well as set. Ignoramus is barely semi-literate in a 
hybrid of bastardised French and Low Latin that made up the legal jargon 
of his time, and his character is ridiculed for the lack of cultivation that 
epitomises the uneducated professional. Ignoramus, for his part, openly 
resents the academic refinement that he lacks: "universitants", as he calls 
his aspiring academic lawyers, will allegedly never make good clerks. 
"Logica? Quae villa, quod burgum est Logica?" (Ruggle 1787: 47 [I: iii]), he 
ripostes to Musaeus, an apprentice who defensively advocates his own 
university schooling in logic. For Ignoramus, an art that is liberal (artium 
liberalium) apparently only counsels in imprudent squandering, and only 
harlots can be the love objects of Musaeus's self-professed amor 
philosophiae. Ignoramus's responses are seemingly not rhetorical because 
his poor command of Latin sets limits to his use of figurative tropes 
(further on Ignoramus and the law, see Tucker 1977). 
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But perhaps it would not be too farfetched to claim that the comedic roles 
have been reversed since Ruggle's Jacobean times. In an article specifically 
addressed to a North American readership, Neil Duxbury paints a grim 
picture about the sorry state of English jurisprudence during the 120 years 
or so that separate John Austin from H.L.A. Hart (Duxbury 2005). 
Duxbury's rich and well-researched account provides an alarmingly 
familiar narrative about how jurisprudence was consistently discredited 
and ridiculed by English law schools and academic lawyers during that 
period. By framing the historical narrative around two prominent names – 
evidently not much worth mentioning took place between Austin and Hart 
– the reader is led to believe that, as a discipline, English jurisprudence 
has always required the shoulders of giants, that without such giants the 
institutional standing of jurisprudence has been at best weak. 
 
During the period that Duxbury deals with – extending roughly from the 
early 19th century to the aftermath of World War II – academic law on the 
continent, by way of contrast, developed in huge leaps. The doctrines that 
had been elaborated by Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) and the 
Historical School were first being methodically formalised by Pandectist 
constructivists such as Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846) and Bernhard 
Windscheid (1817-1892) and later consolidated into the rigour of a 
properly scientific approach to law by Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892) and 
his followers (see e.g. Wieacker 1995; Reimann 1990).1 This development, 
undoubtedly representing one of the most important periods in the history 
of continental law, provided the scholarly foundation on which the likes of 
Max Weber (1864-1920) and Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) would subsequently 
build contemporary sociology of law and legal positivism respectively. The 
                                                   
1 Chris Thornhill (Thornhill 2007) provides an excellent overview of the 
overall political and philosophical developments during the period. 
3 
 
codification of the German civil code (Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch, BGB) that 
entered into force after two decades of preparatory work on January 1, 
1900, represents the socio-political culmination of this period.2 
 
There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Duxbury's historical narrative 
about England apart from its suspicious seamlessness; no real exception 
manages to break through the chilling regularity of disdain. For our 
purposes in this essay, it is, however, sufficient to flesh out and to further 
expand on two parallel observations. 
 
In Duxbury's account, a key factor explaining the discredit that 
jurisprudence apparently suffered from amongst lawyers of that period 
was the close affiliation between legal academia and the practice. 
Practitioners often made up a large part of the law school's teaching staff, 
and from the practitioner's point of view, jurisprudence represented a 
detached approach that was next to impossible to apply in the lawyer's 
everyday work. Even the institutional framework of the law school in 
general was geared to service the vocational needs of the practice. Because 
jurisprudence did not offer clear solutions to practical problems, it was 
regarded as largely superfluous and even as unnecessary distraction from 
the essential. This view was especially evident in law schools of the so-
called newer universities that understood their role primarily as providers 
of vocational training mainly for "articled" apprentices who were already 
practising their trade under the supervision of mentoring solicitors. 
 
                                                   
2 Although the historical sketch of the "continent" provided here is 
exclusively German, similar developments took place in other European 
countries at around the same time. 
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The isolationist self-perception of law schools as providers of vocational 
training also engendered an academic response. The universities had no 
real interest in supporting law's non-existent aspirations to become a 
proper academic discipline, and the development of jurisprudence, that is, 
of the one subject in the law school's curriculum that colleagues in other 
disciplines might have been ready to recognise as genuinely "academic", 
was largely left to the initiative of individual non-lawyers like Hart. So 
while the vocational law school distanced itself from the academic 
environment into which it had been placed, the university responded with 
corresponding misgivings about the scholarly merits of the discipline 
seemingly obsessed with its vocational obligations and professional 
affiliations. 
 
Highlighting these observations, we can relatively safely infer two 
generalisations from Duxbury's account without doing too much violence 
to his original historically contextualised narrative. 
 
Firstly, Duxbury's claims about English jurisprudence as a discipline apply 
more generally to law as it is "practised" in English law schools. The fate of 
jurisprudence in England reflects well the anti-intellectual framework 
within which a particular mode of "Anglo-Saxon" legal thinking has 
evolved even if the institutional status of jurisprudence itself may have 
improved since Hart's days. Juridical anti-intellectualism favours the 
textbook and the legal manual over the research monograph, instruction 
and skills over education and edification. And even in its properly 
academic guises, it will steer clear from what it considers to be 
unproductive self-reflection and harbour the kind of technical interest of 
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knowledge that the French sociologist of law Henri Lévy-Bruhl somewhat 
uncritically hailed as juristique (see Lévy-Bruhl 1950).3 
 
Secondly, even though the source material of Duxbury's research is 
historically determined, many of his claims about jurisprudence between 
Austin and Hart resemble curiously the way in which law is understood as 
the defining element of today's English law school. The distrust of 
jurisprudence and other non-practical approaches to law is just as 
detectable today as it was a hundred years ago to which the continuous 
tension between an academically determined "liberal legal education" and 
the demands of "vocational preparation" bears witness. Jurisprudence, 
often pushed into the ghetto of the curriculum's optional choices, is seen as 
just that: it is radically "optional", apparently having only a marginal 
relation to the professionalism of the practitioner. 
 
Drawing on these generalisations, the aims of this essay are twofold. It will 
first focus on the peculiarities and historical origins of an "Anglo-Saxon" 
legal thinking as one of two ideal types that Max Weber develops in his 
sociology of law. A key factor in understanding the difference between the 
continental and Anglo-Saxon legal thinking is the educational 
                                                   
3 Juridical anti-intellectualism is, of course, not a uniquely English 
phenomenon. In many continental legal cultures, it began as an anti-
metaphysical and anti-formalist critique of German Pandecticism often 
inspired by the socialist politics of the Freirechtsschule (see e.g. 
Kantorowicz 1906). But in, for example, the Nordic countries, the critique 
of formalism subsequently ended up as a watered-down variant of legal 
realism with all the rhetorical venom of an Axel Hägerström but none of 
the intellectual rigour of an Alf Ross or, in other words, the "worst of both 
worlds". 
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environment in which the legal rationalities representing the ideal types 
were first developed and subsequently disseminated in education. 
However, this essay will focus less on the educational element itself but 
will instead shed light on the role of the legal academic as a social actor 
involved in the process. Moreover, in trying to argue for the centrality of a 
formal legal rationality in the development of modern capitalism, Weber 
must also acknowledge a contradiction. English law namely never aspired 
to such a formal rationality even though the country's socio-economic 
development was otherwise comparable. This discrepancy is often referred 
to as Weber's "England problem". 
 
After the Anglo-Saxon ideal type has been contrasted with its continental 
counterpart, a tentative attempt will be made to outline an academic 
approach to law that is properly at home in the university. The provisional 
claim of this essay is that the building blocks of such an approach can 
already be found by radicalising the theoretical premises of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, that is, of the social sciences and the humanities 
including law that were once thought to stand in radical opposition to the 
natural sciences. By trying to respond to short-term instrumentalist 
demands that concern law understood as a social institution – the law is 
expected to deliver feasible solutions to practical problems – the academic 
discipline of law has gradually drifted further away from the hermeneutical 
core of the interpretative disciplines that it was once a part of. The 
conflation of the social institution and the academic discipline into one 
undifferentiated "law" is one of the key factors contributing to the 
university jurist's self-induced isolation in her academic environment. The 
essay will attempt to revitalise and radicalise the idea of law as a human 
science, and it is Weber's problem with England that gives an early clue as 
to how to proceed. 
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Weber's "England problem" 
In his essay "Politics as a Vocation", Weber outlines a historical typology of 
the "professional politician", that is, the political official employed by the 
Prince in his incessant struggles against the rising power of the estates. As 
in many of Weber's typologies, it is difficult to say for sure whether the 
succession of ideal types is intended to portray a gradual progression into 
mature European capitalism, but the evolutionary undertow is certainly 
audible. As his fifth and final ideal type of the professional politician, 
Weber names the university-trained jurist. Weber claims that only the 
unique rationality characteristic of the jurist could enable the development 
of both the sovereign state and party politics as the management of 
collective interests (Weber 1988: 522-523). 
 
For Weber, it is, then, not so much a question about the possible political 
alliances that either the Prince or the estates may have forged with their 
legal lackeys. The historical development of the modern state and its 
unique administrative and bureaucratic infrastructure has more to do with 
the university-based education of jurists and, further, with the formal 
rationality that the universities provided in their training. This rationality 
was conceptualised around the structural architecture of Roman law as 
developed by the constructivist Pandectists and enhanced with secularised 
doctrines from natural and canon law. 
 
But here, just as in his sociology of law in general, Weber must himself 
acknowledge what is commonly known as his "England problem". The 
important role of jurists in the development of continental European 
societies was largely due to the education that they received at university, 
but England managed to develop along very similar historical lines even 
though the training of lawyers was arranged in a very different way. The 
difference has both substantial and institutional dimensions, but certainly 
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one of the decisive factors was the different emphasis given to Roman law 
on the continent and in England respectively: 
 
The tremendous after-effect of Roman law, as transformed by the 
late Roman bureaucratic state, stands out in nothing more clearly 
than the fact that everywhere the revolution of political 
management in the direction of the evolving rational state has 
been borne by trained jurists. This also occurred in England, 
although there the great national guilds of jurists hindered the 
reception of Roman law (Weber 1988: 522). 
 
Roman law may have always been studied by English scholars as an 
historical phenomenon, but legal historians and comparatists generally 
agree that it was never "received" in England in the same way as it was on 
the continent. So if the foundation of the rationality required for the 
development of the modern state was missing in England – that is, a 
university education based on Roman law – how could England's social 
and economic development be so similar? Weber also claims that despite 
the later introduction of "scientific" training in legal education in England 
– Weber is, no doubt, referring to the reforms that followed the critical 
1846 report of the Select Committee on Legal Education – modern Anglo-
Saxon law remains an empirical skill where the charismatic nature of 
adjudication is important in relation to the hierarchical status of the courts 
and even to the personal authority of the judges. This particular aspect 
relating to the authority of the courts leads Weber to associate the 
common law with ancient oracles: 
 
… the role that the decision plays as the indispensible and specific 
form in which the common law comes to flesh corresponds to the 
role of the oracle in ancient law: "What was hitherto uncertain (i.e. 
the existence of a principle of law) has now (i.e. through the 
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decision) become a permanent rule." Only a decision that is 
blatantly "absurd" or "contrary to a legitimate command" lacks 
charismatic quality and can safely be disregarded. The absence of 
rational grounds is the only thing that distinguishes the oracle 
from the English precedent (Weber 1947b: 407).  
 
The decision of the common law is, then, dependent on a charismatic form 
of authority that Weber elsewhere mostly associates with either historically 
redundant religious societies or with dictatorships founded on a cult of 
personality. And because charismatic authority is intrinsically immune to 
external regulation, Weber considers it to be fundamentally irrational even 
if the English courts are obliged to provide rationalising grounds for their 
decisions. Furthermore, charismatic authority is an unstable and 
exceptional form of domination that tends to quickly stabilise itself by 
settling into the routines of the everyday, and as such, it becomes 
institutionalised often merging with traditional authority (Weber 1947b: 
758-763) as the case of the common law would seem to indicate. 
 
So despite the regularities in the socio-political and economical 
development of the various European countries, Weber must conclude that 
in English law "the degree of the rationality of law is essentially lower, and 
it is also of a different type than the rationality of continental European 
law" (Weber 1947b: 510). Not only is the rationality of English law 
qualitatively different, but there is also quantitatively less of it. From this 
one could, perhaps, tentatively conclude that, in Weber's own scheme of 
the categories of legal rationality (Weber 1947b: 395-397; see also Trubek 
1972: 727-731), English law is essentially a substantively irrational form of 
legal thinking. It is irrational to the extent that it is casuistic rather than 
general, and it is substantive in so far as its casuistry is open to non-legal 
considerations such as religious, moral, political and even emotional 
arguments or, in short, "purposive" arguments. 
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However, many commentators hold that Weber cannot resolve his 
"England problem" in a satisfactory way. David Trubek, to take one 
distinguished Weber scholar from the area of law, attributes the 
discrepancy to a clash between Weber's commitment to accurate historical 
description and his aspirations for theoretical consistency. So rather than 
imposing the deviating case of England into his general theoretical 
framework, Weber prefers to leave the issue ambiguous (Trubek 1972: 
746-748). Sally Ewing, for her part, attempts to resolve the "England 
problem" by making a distinction between Weber's research into the 
formal characteristics of law and his analysis of its sociological rationality. 
Ewing namely claims that in the latter sense the common law is no less 
able to promote the development of capitalism than formally rational civil 
law (Ewing 1987: 497-502). Be what may, Weber does insist on some type 
of causality between the formal legal rationality so essential for the 
development of modern capitalism and the university-based education of 
jurists. So how was the training of "substantively irrational" Anglo-Saxon 
lawyers organised as compared to their "formally rational" continental 
counterparts? And what was the role of Roman law in this difference? 
 
In discussing the relatively weak influence that Roman law had on the laws 
of England, T.F.T. Plucknett first notes that the Anglo-Saxon migrations in 
the 4th and 5th centuries all but wiped out the old tradition of Roman law. 
But even as an intellectual framework, the possible uses of Roman law in 
England would have been limited. On the continent, it served as a 
comparative standard with which the academically-minded jurists that 
were in allegiance to the crown were able to conceptually unify a variety of 
local customs. "Romanising" these customs enabled the king to better 
administer the plurality of his extended realm. But in early medieval 
England, there were only three main customs – Wessex, Mercia and 
Danelaw – that were relatively easy to administer anyway. Moreover, the 
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common law was introduced soon after, and its rationale was completely 
different: 
 
The imposition of the common law was not the work of jurists with 
legal dogmas to apply, but of administrators who disposed of writs 
and procedures for the king's profit. This system did not attempt 
to unify, or to reform, the local customs; it simply ignored them 
(Plucknett 1939: 48). 
 
The judges that worked for the king by implementing the common law 
came from the ranks of civil servants and would not usually have a 
university education in Roman or canon law. Later the judiciary was 
completely laicised and separated from the clergy. Independence also 
brought about huge financial rewards, and so this new wealthy class of 
juridical administrators drifted even further away from the universities 
where the clergy had traditionally received its legal education. And finally, 
Plucknett concludes, when the training of common lawyers was gradually 
assigned to the Inns of Court starting from the beginning of the 14th 
century, the English lawyer's isolation from academia was complete: 
 
The English legal profession was isolated, insular, small, and very 
homogeneous. All the important business came to Westminster 
where bench and bar formed one club of experts who could settle 
questions with equal ease in court or at supper. ... But this small 
group was also ambitious and powerful. It dominated parliament; 
when prerogative courts arose, it was still common lawyers who 
practised before the chancery and star chamber. They seem to 
have guessed the danger that new courts might import foreign 
learning, and deliberately organized a counter-attack. Civilians 
had, in fact, obtained a footing in the court of requests, admiralty, 
and in the post-reformation ecclesiastical courts, but the common 
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lawyers succeeded in abolishing the first, and in reducing the 
others to impotence (Plucknett 1939: 50). 
 
Roman law was regarded as an applicable form of law only by the Oxbridge 
educated advocates of the Doctors' Commons, a society of civilian lawyers 
practicing mainly in the ecclesiastical courts (see e.g. Baker 2002). The 
society, famously ridiculed by Charles Dickens in Sketches by Boz (see 
Dickens 1837: 175-190), was dissolved shortly after the Court of Probate 
Act 1857 rid the civilians of their practicing prerogatives. Indeed, in his 
history of English law, Frederic Maitland claims that an initial medieval 
influence of Roman law gradually withered away because it could not be 
applied in English courts by English lawyers: 
 
As to Roman law, it led to nothing. For a while in their enthusiasm 
men might be content to study for its own sake this record of 
human wisdom, of almost superhuman wisdom, so it must have 
seemed to them. But it soon became plain that in England there 
would be no court administering Roman law, unless it were the 
court of a learned university (Pollock - Maitland 1898: 122). 
 
Just like Plucknett, Maitland here juxtaposes law as it was practised by the 
common lawyer with a "learned university" that was more receptive to the 
external influences of Roman law. And the Inns of Court with their own 
educational functions played a decisive role in warding these influences 
off. In the pressures of humanistic Renaissance ideals and the general 
reception of Roman law on the continent, the Inns of Court as educational 
institutions and "schools of living law" managed to secure a "gothic 
revival" of medieval English law: 
 
No English institutions are more distinctively English than the 
Inns of Court; of none is the origin more obscure. ... Unchartered, 
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unprivileged, unendowed, without remembered founders, these 
groups of lawyers formed themselves and in course of time evolved 
a scheme of legal education: an academic scheme of the medieval 
sort, oral and disputatious. For good and ill that was a big 
achievement: a big achievement in the history of some 
undiscovered continents. We may well doubt whether aught else 
could have saved English law in the age of the Renaissance 
(Maitland 1901: 26-27). 
 
Weber presents this same historical narrative in a slightly different way. 
He understands legal education mainly as a way of conveying what he calls 
"legal thinking", that is, a body of professional knowledge (Weber 1947b: 
456-467). The differences in legal thinking on the continent and in 
England result mainly from two parallel historical influences: the political 
status of the professional bodies on the one hand, and the development of 
legal doctrine as a response to social needs on the other. Weber first makes 
the basic distinction between what he calls an empirical knowledge of law 
handed down by the practitioners themselves and a theoretical or rational 
type of knowledge developed in and provided by the universities. To 
further highlight his own preferences – or even prejudices, as some might 
claim – Weber associates the former approach with the artisan crafts 
(handwerksmässig) while reserving the epithet "scientific" 
(wissenschaftlich) for the latter. We start off, then, with a basic distinction 
between "law as craft" typical of Anglo-Saxon law and continental "law as 
science". 
 
Weber claims that the Anglo-Saxon "law as craft" approach was able to 
develop only because of the powerful guilds that the legal profession had 
organised into. The Inns of Court were able to protect their financially 
motivated monopoly over legal training through pupilages, 
apprenticeships and lecturing in both case law and court etiquette by 
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warding off the universities and their Pandectist interests. The practical 
training provided by the Inns favoured an approach that was based on 
precedent and analogy, and such a focus further prevented the 
accumulation of legal material into any systematic unity. Weber concludes: 
 
The aim of the legal practice itself was not to develop a rational 
system but instead to create practically exploitable schemata of 
contracts and claims that addressed the typically recurring 
singular needs of the interested parties (Weber 1947b: 457). 
 
Weber notes a further consequence that arises from this "cautelary 
jurisprudence". The concepts that Anglo-Saxon law formulated were 
always oriented towards tangible and concrete facts that were familiar 
from the everyday experiences of the practitioner and were, in that sense, 
also formal. But their interrelations were restricted to unambiguous 
external characteristics and expanded on through previously recorded 
ways: 
 
These were not, then, general concepts that could be abstracted 
from descriptions, whose meaning could be logically constructed, 
formulated through generalisation and subsumption and 
syllogistically applied to norms. The purely empirical concerns of 
the legal practice and of legal doctrine infers one singular 
proposition from another in order to be able to deduct individual 
judgements from them but does not pursue a general proposition 
(Weber 1947b: 457). 
 
Wilfrid Prest expresses this same trait of the common law, "a formless, 
confused jumble of undigested particulars, successfully resisting all efforts 
at simplification or systematic statement", in the following way: 
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It was a truism of both practising common lawyers and text book 
writers that the common law was rationally grounded upon 
various well-known fundamentals. By this they did not mean that 
its detailed propositions could be deduced from certain basic 
premises, nor that it was a neat and symmetrical body of 
knowledge. The reason of the law was in fact a mystique, a trade 
secret, which could only be comprehended by those who had 
diligently applied themselves to its subtleties for many years (Prest 
1967: 31). 
 
Weber has, then, developed two ideal types of legal thinking. On the one 
hand, we have a scientifically motivated thinking that is based on a 
systematised framework of abstract legal concepts and propositions and 
their logical interrelations as represented by continental law. On the other 
hand, we have a "crafty" type of thinking allegedly typical of Anglo-Saxon 
law that draws its material from the individual successes of the 
practitioner and attempts to consolidate its findings so that they can be 
further exploited through repetition by other practitioners. Weber's ideal 
types are, of course, just that. They are reductionist explanations of how a 
hypothetical social actor might understand her own action, but they do not 
necessarily appear as such in the real world. 
 
But who are the social actors behind Weber's ideal types? 
 
In relation to his preferred continental variant of Rechtsdenken, Weber 
usually talks about "jurists" as a monolithic mass of professional social 
actors. But the social actor constructing and disseminating legal thinking 
in a university environment must be quite different from the actor who 
translates the formal rationality she has been instructed in at university 
into working bureaucratic practices. There is, then, a difference between 
the instructor and the instructed, between the university jurist and the 
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practitioner educated at university. The seminal publications of university 
jurists from Weber's own time that laid down the foundations for this 
formal rationality were mostly put together from lecture notes. But it is 
plain that, for example, von Jhering's Geist des römischen Rechts (von 
Jhering 1852) could never have been intended as a practical manual for 
future lawyers. It did not have any immediate relation to the vocational 
concerns of the practitioner who, while at university, neither requested nor 
received tangible tools for her everyday work. 
 
In her task of reformulating the material of law within a rational and 
scientific framework, the closest associates of Weber's university jurist, the 
"legal academic", were not legal practitioners but her colleagues in 
academia irrespective of their disciplinary orientation: theologians, 
historians, social theorists, economists, humanists, linguists, and so on. 
Even Weber's own multifaceted academic profile as jurist, economist, 
historian and sociologist bears witness to this. By way of contrast, today's 
"academic lawyer" is mostly isolated from the rest of academia in her 
obstinate and intellectually barren affiliation with the practice and her 
implied commitment to seek practicable solutions for courts and 
practitioners. Unable to differentiate between law the institution and law 
the discipline, she assumes by default the position of the legal practitioner 
dedicating her academic work to providing guidance and tools for good 
lawyering. 
 
Furthermore, the epistemological template under which Weber's 
university jurist conducted her research was devised for the human 
sciences in general covering both the humanities and the theoretical social 
sciences, whereas in today's academic debate claims are made for the 
doctrinal uniqueness of law and its subsequent autonomy in relation to 
other disciplines. And it is often law's affiliation with the practice that is 
said to account for this uniqueness. 
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The validity of the code 
The history of the common law is often wrapped into a heroic narrative in 
which the home-grown legal culture successfully wards off threatening 
alien influences. To a certain extent this is, no doubt, very true. But we can 
also reframe the narrative into an internal conflict between the two social 
actors: the university jurist and the practitioner or, as one could rephrase 
these in the contemporary university environment, the legal academic and 
the academic lawyer. The former represents Weber's notion of the 
university trained jurist, the humanist lawyer whose main contribution to 
modern bureaucratic practices has been the scholarly systematisation of 
normative data. The latter, for her part, remains a thematic variation of the 
practising lawyer who, even in her academic activities, remains 
constrained by the practical concerns of mundane lawyering. And in this 
internal conflict, it is the latter that currently has the upper hand. 
 
In making the argument for the academic lawyer, reference is often made 
to the legal academic's alienation from the "real world" of the law that the 
academic lawyer allegedly has privileged access to through her affiliation 
with the practice. When in 1883 Albert Dicey asked in his inaugural lecture 
whether English law could be taught at university in the first place, his 
affirmative response was meant to provocatively address the general 
mistrust of academia that the legal community harboured. Dicey 
summarises the advantages of a non-academic vocational training in the 
following way: 
 
The merits, in short, of the present system may be all summed up 
in the one word "reality". It brings a student in contact with the 
real actual business, and fosters in him qualities which cannot be 
produced by any theoretical teaching, however excellent. 
Readiness, technical skill, sound judgment, the power of 
disentangling from a mass of bewildering details the essential 
18 
 
features of a complicated case, the habit of applying to the actual 
affairs of men the well-established rules of law, are qualities to be 
acquired, in so far as they are not the gifts of nature, by practice, 
and by practice alone (Dicey 1883: 8). 
 
Later Dicey resolves his dichotomy by reducing the university jurist to 
little more than the practitioner's sidekick, and so he can comfortably 
conclude that the contradiction between a practical vocational training and 
a "theoretical" university education is merely apparent. With this move, 
the university jurist as academic lawyer is hailed as the practitioner's 
intellectual accomplice leaving the legal academic, estranged from the 
"reality" of law, to tinker with the minutiae of her formal propositions. The 
move is reminiscent of the claims that American legal realists would later 
make about "law in action" or "living law" in their criticisms of formalist 
approaches to law. 
 
But the continental legal academic exercises her socio-political kudos in 
slightly different ways than her Anglo-Saxon counterpart. A first avenue of 
influence is related to the specific political responsibilities that the 
academic's professional life includes. Legal academics are often heard as 
experts in governmental bodies such as law commissions and legislative 
committees, and through their expertise, academics often have a tangible 
– albeit often anonymous – influence on the drafting of legislative 
initiatives. The expertise of the legal academic is not limited to mere legal 
technicalities but often covers even the most fundamental principles that 
inform the initiative in question. Although this type of socio-political 
influence is not altogether absent in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, it is less 
significant and limited to a very small elite. 
 
The second and more significant way in which the continental legal 
academic practices her socio-political standing is through what can be 
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called codificatory temperance. In continental law drafting, individual 
legislative initiatives that are collected together under a code are 
structured into the codificatory framework with the help of a logic, real or 
supposed, that precedes the act of legislation. In, for example, the great 
European civil law codifications – primarily the French Code civil of 1804 
and the German BGB of 1900 – the preceding codificatory framework was 
heavily influenced by the structure and logic of the Roman ius civile as it 
had been developed by the Pandectists and other legal scholars in the 
universities. The legal academic's codificatory framework provided the 
structural preconditions of the codes. Once legislated into valid law, the 
codificatory framework itself acquires a validity of its own that often 
outlives the individual reforms that the substantive law must endure. So a 
subsequent change in the law will, for example, have to comply with the 
overall logical structure of the code that was originally provided by the 
legal academic. The validity of the codificatory framework is further 
strengthened by it being perceived rather as a logical precondition for the 
use of legislative powers than the academic's politically motivated attempt 
to influence government. The legislator will, then, be compelled to temper 
its powers in such a way that the logical consistency of the codificatory 
framework is respected in subsequent legislation. 
 
The continental doctrine of legal sources extends the validity of the 
codificatory framework into the courtroom. According to the doctrine – 
itself developed by legal academics – the sources of law that an adjudicator 
uses in making her decision are divided into compulsory sources such as 
statutory law and precedent, and admissible sources such as, for example, 
the legislator's travaux préparatoires. In many continental jurisdictions, 
legal doctrine is itself regarded as an admissible source of law if primary 
compulsory sources fail to provide unequivocal guidance. As an analytical 
presentation of enacted law, legal doctrine is likely to reinforce the validity 
of the codificatory framework that is already present in the primary 
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sources applied. Doctrine provides interpretative recommendations by 
fleshing out interdependencies between individual norms in such a way 
that the adjudicator in doubt may draw on the binding force of the overall 
structure of the code. Again the authority of legal doctrine is seen to stem 
rather from its logical qualities than from any political motives, but the 
opinions of the courts seldom make overt references to academic 
literature. Unlike the continental adjudicator, the English judge can 
seldom be seen to structure her opinions on any academically recognisable 
pattern. The few explicit references to academic literature are sometimes 
even coupled with a reservation about the general authority of doctrine in 
legal decision making.4 
 
The socio-political implications of all this for the continental legal 
academic are far from unambiguous. On the one hand, the codificatory 
framework can well be interpreted as an expression of the fundamentally 
conservative nature of doctrinal law: it imposes formal and "logical" 
restrictions hampering social reform, it can be said to serve the interests of 
the established power elites, and so on.  An illustrative example of this 
would be the reservations that many jurisdictions may have had against 
limitations to free contracting such as the introduction of unfair contract 
terms or legal measures for consumer protection. On the other hand, it has 
also served what can clearly be perceived to be progressive ends. On one 
level, formal and logical restraints can, if not prevent, at least hinder 
                                                   
4 In R v. G and Another ([2004] 1 A.C. 1034, 1055-1056), Lord Bingham 
claims that a decision "is not, of course, to be overruled or departed from 
simply because it meets with disfavour in the learned journals. But a 
decision which attracts reasoned and outspoken criticism by the leading 
scholars of the day, respected as authorities in the field, must command 
attention". 
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draconic abuses of state powers in, for example, the area of criminal law. 
But it can also contribute towards progressive ends through mechanisms 
resembling what Duncan Kennedy calls "formalised substantive 
rationality" (Kennedy 2004: 1071-1076). Once new provisions such as 
unfair contract terms or provisions for consumer protection have been 
legislated into the code, the revised codificatory framework will also allow 
for similar reforms in other parts of the law as well. In other words, once 
one element of welfare state legislation has been introduced, the revised 
framework will facilitate similar changes in other areas of substantive law. 
 
But overall and historically speaking, continental doctrinal law has always 
included within itself a formalised social-democratic ethos of solidarity 
that has enhanced the realisation of the Northern European welfare state. 
In the process of formalisation, the ethos of solidarity has, of course, been 
"dehumanised" in much a similar way as the Calvinist ascetic ethos of the 
puritan when it was formalised into capitalist entrepreneurship (see 
Weber 1986: 163-206). But in relation to the Anglo-Saxon academic 
lawyer, one could claim that the primary juridical affiliation of the 
continental legal academic is not the adjudicator or the practitioner but the 
legislator. 
 
If we consider the "crafty" university jurist allegedly representing Anglo-
Saxon law, the situation seems quite different. She is primarily seen as an 
educator. Under the perceived or real pressures imposed by the 
professional bodies and their educational representatives, the significance 
of vocational preparation in law schools has been optimised at the expense 
of what was once called a "liberal legal education" which is the closest 
English equivalent to a Humboldtian university ideal. Correspondingly, 
her research is seldom expected to be more than textbooks and legal 
manuals, her primary affiliations are thought to be with the legal practice 
rather than the interdisciplinary university, the education she provides at 
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university centres on vocational skills, and so on. Already Weber had noted 
a similar tension between two different approaches in higher education: 
 
Behind all present discussions concerning the basic principles of 
the educational system, the struggle of the "professional man" type 
against the old "cultivated humanity" has acquired a decisive role 
in the irresistibly expanding bureaucratization of all public and 
private relations of authority and the ever-increasing significance 
of professional knowledge. And this struggle involves even the 
most intimate cultural questions (Weber 1947b: 677). 
Elective affinities and choices 
When Weber describes the idiosyncrasies of English legal education and 
Anglo-Saxon legal thinking, his verstehende or interpretative sociology 
includes a blind-spot that Weber himself seems to be aware of but is 
unable to address. Weber's sociology is namely itself a product of the 
society that it primarily describes. All his historical and comparative 
excursuses are, in the end, attempts to bring meaning to one particular 
form of society, that is, modern European capitalism and more specifically 
its continental market-capitalist variant. In so doing, Weber applies the 
formally rational categories that he claims to be unique to that society even 
to phenomena that are not intrinsically either formal or rational. Weber 
will, for example, always see emotiveness as an opposite of reason, the 
religious as an opposite of the secular, the private as an opposite of the 
public, and so on. But what he is unable to grasp is a society where such 
rationally constructed opposites are senseless. An educated British Muslim 
may, for example, understand the sacrifices that she must make in order to 
comply with the restrictions to autonomous self-expression as they are 
conveyed in the Sharia law, but for a rice-farmer in Indonesia totally 
immersed in her Islamic world-view the whole question about autonomous 
self-expression may appear as senseless. So Weber's excursuses will often 
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function merely as the contrasting background against which modern 
European capitalism and its peculiar type of rationality are set. 
 
Consequently Weber's rational and scientific world-view that may well 
accurately depict the self-understanding of the continental variant of 
modern market capitalism colonises everything that it describes and is 
consequently unable to understand an external object of research in 
Weber's own meaning, that is, as a structurally adequate and heuristic 
description of the meanings that social actors attach to their own actions. 
Weber may well be accused of "colonising" the common law in a similar 
way. His is an external continental account of the rationality – or the lack 
thereof – of Anglo-Saxon legal thinking, and as such, one could claim that 
it does not represent a true "understanding" of the phenomenon itself. 
 
In addition to Weber's own methodological limitations, this essay has 
stretched the confines of its own approach beyond what many would 
recognise as an authentically Weberian perspective on law and society. By 
comparing how different arrangements in legal education have contributed 
to specific forms of legal thinking in England and on the continent, this 
essay has tried to infer the unique characteristics of one particular social 
actor that Weber perhaps implies but never explicitly discusses: the legal 
academic. Like Weber's own descriptive categories in general, the legal 
academic can only be an ideal type of a position that is possible for the 
university jurist but that does not appear as such in the real world. The 
legal academic's counterpart, that is, the academic lawyer, may perhaps be 
best described as the representative of an Anglo-Saxon legal thinking, but 
in its pure form, this contrasting ideal type is just as rare in the real world 
as the legal academic. The Anglo-Saxon academic lawyer does, however, 
highlight the predicament of the contemporary university jurist who is 
ever more frequently reduced into a thematic variation of the legal 
practitioner. 
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Moreover, by designating the legal academic as a possible position or, in 
other words, as relative to choice, the ideal type takes on a political and 
normative character that would be, if not impossible, at least problematic 
for Weber. The orthodoxies of established Weber scholarship would hardly 
allow for such conclusions. How can Weber, then, equipped with a 
seemingly inadequate method and facing an apparently irresolvable 
"England problem" contribute to our understanding of the law and the 
social world? And what possible insights can Weber offer us into the 
predicament of the university jurist? 
 
According to the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the 
impasses that Weber is himself unable to address in a satisfactory way are, 
indeed, his very strength (see also Arnason 1993). For Merleau-Ponty, 
Weber's inconsistencies and deficiencies provide a way of understanding 
history through symbolic matrices where a fundamental choice such as, for 
example, a specific form of legal thinking makes a particular form of 
society possible through its affinities with other choices such as economy, 
education, religion and the state. Merleau-Ponty claims that Weber's 
notion of "elective affinity" (Wahlverwandtschaft) enables us to 
understand the historical event as something other than a mere 
concurrence of circumstances but without making it into an imminent 
historical necessity either. Weber namely claims that it is possible to assert 
something on the degree of elective affinity between concrete structural 
forms "as to whether and how strongly they mutually favour one another's 
continuance or, conversely, hinder or exclude one another, whether they 
are 'adequate' or 'inadequate' in relation to one another" (Weber 1947a: 
183; see also Howe 1978). Merleau-Ponty clarifies this affinity through the 
notion of choice: 
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... it is as though it were in contact with one another that these 
choices were together finally able to produce Western capitalism, 
and the essence of the system does not pre-exist their encounter. 
Pluralism that seemed to be an obstacle to any unified 
interpretation of history is now on the contrary proof of the 
solidarity of the economic order and the order of politics, the order 
of law, the order of morality or religion, as soon as the economic 
order is itself treated as the choice of a relation amongst men and 
with the world and takes its place in the logic of choice (Merleau-
Ponty 1968: 49-50). 
 
Later Merleau-Ponty develops these Weberian influences into the concept 
of institution. Criticising the emphasis on pure coincidence in a 
structuralist understanding of history (Lévi-Strauss), Merleau-Ponty 
notes: 
 
Institution in the strong sense of the word is this symbolic matrix 
that opens up a field, a dimensional future that makes a common 
experience and a history as consciousness possible (Merleau-Ponty 
2003: 45). 
 
And further: 
 
Thus what we mean by institution are those events in experience 
that endow it with durable dimensions in relation to which a whole 
series of other experiences will acquire meaning, will form an 
intelligible series or a history – or, further, these events which 
deposit in me a meaning, not just as a vestige or a residue, but as 
an appeal for a continuance, a demand for a future (Merleau-Ponty 
2003: 124). 
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Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Weber is twofold. On the one hand, he 
recognises in Weber's phenomenology a non-Hegelian philosophy of 
history that is neither systematic nor strives for absolute knowledge: 
 
Historical understanding does not introduce a system of arbitrarily 
chosen categories but only presupposes the possibility that we 
have a past that is ours, that in our freedom we can recapture the 
work of many other freedoms, that we can clarify the choices of 
others with our own and ours with theirs, that we can rectify one 
by the other, and that we can finally arrive at the truth. There is no 
greater respect, no objectivity more profound, than this claim of 
going to the source from which all history emanates. History is not 
an external god, a hidden reason of which we only have to record 
the conclusions; it is the metaphysical fact that one and the same 
life, our own, is played out both within us and outside us, in our 
present and in our past, that the world is a system with several 
points of entry, or, as one might say, that we have fellow men 
(Merleau-Ponty 1955: 34-35). 
 
But related to this, on a much more personal level, Merleau-Ponty 
identifies unreservedly with Weber's "militant, even suffering, heroic" 
liberalism (Merleau-Ponty 1955: 41). Merleau-Ponty is unwilling to accept 
the orthodoxy of French party-led communism that subjects knowledge to 
the demands of political practice, and even if his own solution remains 
inadequate, he reveres the way in which Weber obstinately refuses to 
surrender his scholarship to propaganda whatever the noble cause may be.  
 
In much a similar vein, the early Raymond Aron argues that Weber's 
political position is born as a consequence of the conflicting interests that 
dominate his rationalised world, and perhaps controversially it is the 
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passionate and lucid devotion of the charismatic leader that must address 
them: 
 
The professional politician lives from politics, but also for it. He is 
not so much motivated by vulgar ambition but by an inner calling, 
a need to act, to influence the destiny of men and their culture. 
Weber was aware that this was an idealisation of the "charismatic" 
leader. But this ideal type was less of a methodological tool and 
more an image of the leader that Weber himself would have liked 
to be: his politics was heroic rather than realist (Aron 1950: 130) 
 
Aron does, however, find Weber the philosopher less contradictory than 
Weber the person. The heroism so essential in Weber's personal 
engagement does not fit easily into the reality of democratic politics, and 
Aron claims that while Weber may have had a well informed idea of what 
to do, he was unwilling to assume the position of power that would enable 
him to implement that idea: 
 
In the end, Weber's politics expresses a requirement of lucidity 
and prefers truth over action, human values over simple efficacy. 
Theoretically he recognised the constraints of politics, but in 
practice he rejected them as soon as they threatened to devalue 
human dignity. He would only have accepted a position of 
leadership in order to elevate the masses to respect true values. 
And this is why he remained an academic (Aron 1950: 132). 
 
Aron contrasts the Weberian as the politician of understanding 
(entendement) with the Marxist as the politician of reason (raison). The 
former preserves values such as freedom and social justice in continuously 
changing situations that follow one another in a more or less unstructured 
way. Finding her way without the help of final objectives, she must 
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acknowledge the dualism of means and ends and of facts and values; for 
her, every new moment resets the challenges that she faces. By way of 
contrast, the politician of reason can to a certain degree rely of historical 
inevitability; the capitalist state will undoubtedly eventually wither away, 
and one would simply need to adopt the correct strategies and tactics in 
order to secure the result. But for Aron the two ideal types represent 
extreme positions neither of which is realisable as such: 
 
One risks degenerating into resignation, the other into blindness; 
one becomes incapacitated because of its dependency on history, 
the other because it forgets it; one is wiser, the other more heroic. 
This also means that all politics is at the same time both one and 
the other. There is no momentary agency that is not determined by 
a remote concern, no confidant of Providence that does not watch 
out for unique opportunities. The qualities of prophet and 
empiricist should not be incompatible. Politics is simultaneously 
the art of irrevocable choice and long-term planning. The man of 
action, open to conjunctures, would aim at the goals that he has 
been assigned in a rigid way (Aron 1948: 331).5 
 
When Weber approaches an historical and social phenomenon such as, for 
example, legal thinking on the continent and in England, his presentation 
of ideal types is for the most part a logical reconstruction of verifiable 
                                                   
5 Michaël Pollak argues that Aron irons out the internal contradictions in 
Weber in order to legitimise a political liberalism: "Where Weber would 
have encountered an irreducible struggle between ultimate values, this 
reading finds in the equilibrium of ideological forces a guarantee of 
pluralism. In this sense the human sciences become instruments of 
permanent social readjustment …" (Pollak 1998: 202). 
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historical data. Weber's neo-Kantian ethos emphasises the centrality of 
propositions constituted by a self-conscious subject of science and 
knowledge. For post-Kantians like Merleau-Ponty and Aron such logical 
reconstructions would be problematic because it is unthinkable that a self-
conscious subject could exist externally in relation to the social world that 
is being observed and analysed. Subject and world are one, and any claim 
that the subject makes about its social world is also one in a series of 
never-ending attempts with which the subject tries to fix its position in 
that world. 
 
Moreover, for Weber the historical phenomena that are being analysed 
would have to display some degree of uniformity in order to be able to 
produce meaning into the social world. The lack of uniformity is exactly 
why the "England problem" is a problem; Anglo-Saxon legal thinking is a 
seemingly inexplicable deviation from the alleged regularity of formal 
rationality in law. But Merleau-Ponty's symbolic matrices and institutions 
need not adhere to such uniformity. Indeed, contrasting dissimilar 
phenomena against each other may well produce an understanding that 
was not even intended in the original study. So, for example, the different 
ways in which legal thinking has developed on the continent and in 
England may give us an insight into the position of the university jurist 
and how that position differs from the one adopted by the practitioner.  
 
For commentators like Trubek, Weber's "England problem" is, indeed, a 
problem because of the apparent causal discrepancy between formally 
rational legal thinking and capitalism. Although the rationality of Anglo-
Saxon law is allegedly both quantitatively and qualitatively different, it did 
not prevent British capitalism from developing in historically speaking 
roughly comparable ways. One can take this argument even further. One 
could namely claim that British capitalism provided the historical 
blueprint for much of the economic development of the remainder of 
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Europe. Weber's abilities of foresight may not have made accurate 
predictions possible, but at least on a logical level the "England problem" 
can remain problematic only on the assumption that British and 
continental "capitalisms" are still comparable. 
 
Perhaps this comparability is easier to contest than one would initially 
think. While many continental European states especially in the north 
continued to remodel Weber's traditional market capitalism into the 
welfare state that roughly speaking represented the cultural bourgeoisie's 
ideological sense of social-democratic solidarity, Britain adopted much 
more readily the free-market ideology of venture capitalism and 
consolidated it in an alleged "special relationship" with the new world. 
Seen from this perspective, today's Britain, as affluent as it may seem, 
represents the unfinished welfare state crippled by the neo-liberal ethos of 
Thatcherism and New Labour. In this respect, the relative differences 
between law schools and university jurists in England and on the continent 
may make more sense. The function of the academic lawyer is to provide 
exploitable individual solutions for a relatively unregulated market 
whereas the legal academic specifically partakes in the regulation of the 
market. 
Tragic modernity 
But it's not as if Weber could unequivocally reinstate his champion to her 
rightful place, for his overall view of the options that are open to the legal 
academic are much more complex than one would presume. Towards the 
end of his essay Science as a Vocation, Weber elaborates on the 
fundamentally contradictory existence of the academic: 
 
The destiny of our times is characterised by rationalisation and 
intellectualisation and, above all, by the disenchantment of the 
world; even the ultimate and most sublime of values have 
31 
 
retreated from the domain of the public either into the 
transcendental realm of mystic life or into the fraternity of direct 
and personal relations amongst individual human beings. It is 
hardly a coincidence that our greatest art is intimate and not 
monumental, nor that it is today only within the most intimate of 
circles amongst individual human beings, in pianissimo, that 
something pulsates which in former times swept, as a prophetic 
pneuma, through the great communities like a firestorm welding 
them together. If we try to force and to "invent" monumentality in 
art, miserable monstrosities such as the many monuments of the 
last twenty years are produced. If one tries to intellectually 
construe new religions without a new and genuine prophecy, then 
something similar in an inner sense will follow, but with even 
worse effects. And, finally, prophecies from the academic podium 
will create only fanatical sects but never a genuine community 
(Weber 1985: 612). 
 
Disenchantment is a recurring theme in Weber and concerns the 
secularised Calvinist-turned-entrepreneur just as much as it does the 
bureaucrat who has left behind her original ideals of social solidarity. The 
loss of the spiritual fabric that once gave meaning to a shared world is 
apparently the price that one must pay for the efficient governing of 
society, and this element of alienation clearly aligns Weber with the 
Marxist tradition. But quite unlike Marx, Weber is both unable and 
unwilling to provide guidance as to what needs to be done. As Aron and 
Merleau-Ponty have pointed out, Weber's radicalness has little to do with 
any specific solutions that the academic might offer for her troubled times. 
It is much more a question of distancing oneself from a Hegelian notion of 
historical inevitability and opening the academic up to the plethora of 
political choices. But these choices are a mixed blessing; there is no 
normative user's manual that could confidently advise the academic on 
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what choices to make. Indeed, quite the contrary, Weber seems to imply 
that any such guidance can only lead to forced results and ultimately 
disaster. 
 
David Trubek takes this argument even further suggesting that there is a 
parallel between Weber's ideas on the nature of the academic's vocation 
and Weber's analysis of law. In both, it seems, Weber asserts what Trubek 
calls a "tragic modernity", that is, a fateful and contradictory destiny that 
can only lead to an impasse: 
 
In the area of legal theory, he [Weber] cut through the triumphant 
mode of this discourse to uncover its darker side and critiqued its 
social and moral pretensions. In the realm of epistemology, he 
demonstrated the inherent limits of positivism, thus undermining 
the claims of those who thought this form of thought could lead to 
human emancipation. But in both cases, he saw no alternative, no 
way to move beyond the dualisms of liberal thought. As a result, 
his thought exhibits contradictory impulses, and his ultimately 
tragic stance is ... one of despair (Trubek 1986: 593). 
 
Anthony Kronman identifies a very similar internal contradiction in 
Weber's account of modern law as a tension between, on the one hand, the 
demystification of law, that is, the instrumental acknowledgement of law 
as a powerful tool for the social planning of a democratic society and, on 
the other, the gradual realisation that the ever-growing complexity of legal 
regulation estranges the layperson from democratic decision-making 
resulting in increasing dependency on a technically proficient professional 
elite (Kronman 1983: 170-175). Kronman need not, however, limit this 
contradiction of legal modernity to the layperson's experiences. We can 
easily imagine how excessive legislation and the "over-juridification" of 
social relations produce similar conflicting effects in the experiences of the 
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university jurist. The instrumentalism that is implied in her formally 
rational legal thinking enhances a sense of mastery and control that the 
escalating complexity of the legal system, the resulting factual 
shortcomings in social planning and the dehumanisation of social relations 
continuously undermine. The modern legal academic remains trapped in 
the no-man's land where she must at once continue to believe in the 
superior efficiency of her unique rationality and yet come to terms, not 
only with the limitations of what it can achieve, but also with the 
undeniable harm that it imposes. 
 
But just like Trubek, Kronman does not see this internal conflict 
necessarily as a flaw in Weber's understanding of law but, rather, as an 
expression of his ambivalent philosophical position to modernity in 
general. Kronman identifies two incompatible strains of critique in Weber 
of which the first is a cautiously Marxist position and the second 
Nietzschean. The first critique addresses the limitations of a formal 
understanding of freedom and equality implied in the type of rationality 
that the university jurist cherishes. Through contractual arrangements one 
can construct the legal relations of one's choice, and one is entitled to 
demand equal treatment before the law. But the ideals of freedom and 
equality can only be fully realised in particular material circumstances that 
go beyond the jurist's formalism. Such material considerations would 
require, for instance, a fair distribution of wealth and humane working 
conditions. These Marxist affiliations have been commented upon often 
enough, but it is Weber's second critique, radically incompatible with the 
first, that is of interest here. Kronman namely argues that Weber's 
Nietzschean aspiration to rehabilitate personal authority in the age of 
depersonified bureaucratic practices represents a radical challenge to both 
the first critique of modernity and to his scientific project as a whole: 
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The egalitarian ideal on which the bureaucratic order rests is 
threatened by the appearance of a leader with courage and passion 
and a sense of responsibility. A true leader feels entitled, by virtue 
of his own extraordinary qualities, to call on his followers to make 
the sacrifices he believes they must; nothing could be further from 
the attitude of the bureaucratic official who seeks, so far as 
possible, to eliminate everything strictly personal from his 
dealings with peers and clients and to perform his duties in a spirit 
of studied passionlessness. The bureaucrat is devoted, above all 
else, to the principle that every citizen is equal before the law, 
regardless of the distinctive personal qualities he happens to 
possess: from the perspective of the ideal bureaucrat, qualities of 
this sort can never be a basis for the exercise of authority. A leader, 
on the other hand, is an extraordinary man who demands to be 
recognized as such and claims the right to rule others on the 
ground that he has both the passion and the courageous self-
discipline required to lead them, in a responsible way, toward the 
goal he champions (Kronman 1983: 184). 
 
Duncan Kennedy recognises in the internal contradiction a Schmittian 
"decisionist" element: 
 
In science, it turns out that "creativity" is not reducible to 
bureaucratically determinable characteristics that govern the 
specialized subdomains of the modem university. It involves an 
agonistic, irrational, intuitive moment without which no amount 
of learning and technique can accomplish anything of note. In 
politics, there is a similar split: The state is reduced more and 
more to a bureaucracy administering a rule system according to 
LFR [logically formal rationality], but the politicians are engaged 
in "fighting" for power, and have to make decisions with big ethical 
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implications using an ethical apparatus that is internally 
contradictory and so often leaves them just having to "decide" 
(Kennedy 2004: 1061-1062). 
 
The modern legal academic's fate is, then, doubly tragic. Not only must she 
recognise the limitations of the law in delivering feasible solutions to social 
problems, but she must also concede to a more general limitedness that is 
inherent in her very existence as an academic if she wishes to stay within 
the constraints of her own project. There is a certain correspondence 
between this impasse and so-called postmodern accounts of the law. The 
Weberian cul de sac with its wealth of choices is coupled with a 
fundamental undecidability, that is, an impossibility of making anything 
more than an informed leap of faith when facing the dualisms of 
liberalism. If we consider Weber's own troubled personal history including 
depression and nervous breakdowns, such a cul de sac can certainly be 
depicted as despairing. But perhaps there is another way of seeing this. 
 
In his highly influential treatise, Martti Koskenniemi depicts the impasse 
that the international lawyer, both academic and practising, faces as an 
irresolvable conflict between the apologetic stance of the disillusioned 
practitioner and the necessarily utopian undercurrent of her vocation. In 
many ways this is a rearticulation of Weber's position. Bureaucratic 
efficiency is essential if one wishes to promote well-being in society, but it 
comes at the price of dehumanisation, of being cut off from the core values 
and principles that motivated one's participation in the promotion of well-
being in the first place. Similarly Koskenniemi's jurist struggles with the 
legal routines that she must by necessity engage with but, at the same time, 
she is required to resist the temptation of being inundated by the private 
fantasy that, nevertheless, feeds her everyday work with the necessary 
imaginative impetus. But where Weber's reaction to the impasse may be 
depicted as despairing, Koskenniemi's jurist revels in it. The uncertainty 
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that arises from the impasse enables the jurist to reject the unfounded 
generalities of lawlike certainties and to re-establish herself as a social 
actor. But her normative position is, Koskenniemi continues, "in the small" 
or, as Weber would say, in pianissimo. For Koskenniemi, normativity in 
pianissimo is synonymous with the integrity of the jurist (Koskenniemi 
2005: 554-555). 
 
One is, however, entitled to ask whether normativity in pianissimo reduces 
the jurist's social agency to ad hoc pragmatism. Is it simply a question of 
unrelated and disparate individual choices made in order to promote 
piecemeal improvements? Koskenniemi denies this because the jurist's 
agency can never take place through an unreflective technique or method. 
In finding meaning to the tasks that she has set herself, the jurist must also 
engage with the prospects of what is possible. In doing so, she must by 
necessity venture beyond her own disciplinary limitations into, for 
example, history, social theory and politics. But surrendering to 
normativity in pianissimo does not mean abandoning the larger project. 
Its political commitment must, however, be redefined: 
 
It is not a commitment which seeks to realize given principles or 
ready-made social arrangements. It aims to construct the whole as 
a structure of open political conflict and constant institutional 
revision. The whole will be seen as a system which enables, as far 
as possible, particularized solutions, aimed at realizing authentic 
commitment. But it gives no intrinsic weight to solutions, once 
adopted, and it is ready to make constant adjustments once this 
seems called for. It positively excludes imperialism and 
totalitarianism. Beyond that, however, it makes no pretention to 
offer principles of the good life which would be valid in a global 
way (Koskenniemi 2005: 556). 
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It is this Nietzschean position revelling in the inevitable conflicts of law 
that the human sciences offer the university jurist. It allows her to 
withdraw from her confused loyalties with the practice and to put herself 
radically into question in her interdisciplinary academic environment. It 
enables her to retain her integrity as a jurist, her sense of purpose and 
commitment as a social actor working from the privileged vantage point 
that academia offers. It includes within itself a constituent moment, an 
inevitable openness to the possibilities of the world that is not and cannot 
be constituted or regulated in advance. And only by seizing the power that 
the constituent moment represents can she fully embrace her position as a 
legal academic. 
 
Perhaps the crux of the legal academic's radical possibility can be summed 
up in a single claim: law is a human science. 
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